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DAVID FRANCK- & JEFFREY POMPE-

Water Transfer between North and
South Carolina: An Option for Policy

Reform
ABSTRACT
In recent years, economic development and a severe drought have
resulted in conflict between water users in the Carolinas over the
flow of the Yadkin-Pee Dee River. Currently, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission is considering renewal of the licenses of
the six North Carolinadams that control water flow into South
Carolina. In the present analysis, we provide a simple two-sector
model to examine the impact of a water transfer programfor the
Yadkin-Pee Dee River as one option for policy reform.
INTRODUCTION
Battles over scarce water resources are common in the arid
western United States. However, until recently, the eastern states have
been relatively free of water supply conflicts. Rapid population and
economic growth, combined with severe drought conditions in recent
years, have increased the number of disputes over water allocation,
especially in the Southeast. Legal wars that began in 1990 between
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida over water in the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint and Alabama-Coosa-Tallaposa river systems
continue today.' Atlanta's growing population covets water in the
Savannah River that is shared by many users in Georgia and South
Carolina. In southwestern Georgia, state agencies implemented
programs to encourage farmers to reduce water use due to the low flow
conditions in the Flint River basin. In the Carolinas, due to the recent
drought, officials recorded some of the lowest water levels ever for
streams, lakes, and rivers. Although drought conditions eased somewhat
in 2003, conflicts over water supplies are likely to resurface in the
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Carolinas and the Southeast as ever-increasing demands are placed on
2
this scarce resource.
In this article we examine the conflict between the Carolinas over
the water flow in the Yadkin-Pee Dee River (YPDR), located in the
piedmont and coastal regions of North and South Carolina. The YPDR
flows for 430 miles between Blowing Rock, North Carolina, and
Georgetown, South Carolina, where it empties into Winyah Bay. In
North Carolina, along a 38 mile stretch of the Yadkin River, Alcoa Power
Generating Inc. operates four dams that supply water for power
generation and for use in it's aluminum processing plants. Progress
Energy operates two dams, also in North Carolina, for hydroelectric
power generation. (See Figure 1.) The first dam was completed in 1911 at
Blewett Falls, and the final dam was completed in 1962 at Tuckertown. In
South Carolina, the Pee Dee River flows freely for 154 miles until it
empties into the Atlantic Ocean.
In South Carolina, many river users depend on sufficient water
flow and suffer economic costs during low flow periods. In South
Carolina, four municipalities use the Pee Dee as a source of drinking
water, and Grand Strand cities such as Myrtle Beach and Georgetown
depend on an adequate river flow in order to keep saltwater out of the
city water supply. Also, five publicly owned wastewater treatment
works and five privately owned companies discharge treated waste into
the Pee Dee. The South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control, which regulates water quality, requires
companies that discharge waste into the River to reduce effluent flow
when water level is below normal assimilative capabilities. Other
industries such as tourism, recreation, and fishing depend on a sufficient
flow of water. Farmers and golf course owners use the River for
irrigation. Low-water flow levels negatively impact property values near
the Pee Dee. An adequate flow of water is also important for economic
development of the Pee Dee region in South Carolina, which has some of
the highest unemployment and lowest income levels in the state. Also,
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reports that a flow of less than 1500
3
cubic feet per second (cfs) will harm wildlife.

2.

Joey Holleman, S.C. Declares Statewide Drought, STATE NEWSPAPER, June 9, 2004, at

B1.
3. Although navigation on the Pee Dee was active early in the nineteenth century,
following the growth of railroads, navigation on the Pee Dee declined and is not an
important activity today. SUZANNE LINDER, A RIVER IN TIME: THE YADKIN-PEEDEE RIVER

SYSTEM 137 (2000).
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Figure 1
Dams on the Yadkin - Pee Dee River

Alcoa Power Generating Inc. Dams
1. High Rock Lake (12,200 acres)
2. Tuckertown Reservoir (2,550 acres)
3. Narrows Reservoir/Badin Lake (5,350 acres)
4. Falls Reservoir (203 acres)
Progress Energy Dams
5. Lake Tillery (5,260 acres)
6. Blewett Falls Lake (2,570 acres)
Similarly, water users in North Carolina could suffer economic
costs if Alcoa and Progress Energy, the dam owners, are required to
release more water than optimal for generating electricity. Because the
generated electricity cannot be stored, firms control the water flow to
generate electricity when needed. Furthermore, there is a significant
amount of residential development along many area lakes. Studies
document that property owners on lakes, such as those created by dams,
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suffer lower property values and recreational values when lakes are
4
drawn down.
A combination of increased water demand and below normal
rainfall between 1997 and 2002 created a struggle between YPDR users in
the summer of 2002. 5 The decrease in water flow is illustrated in Table 1.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sets the minimum
flow that owners of the six dams in North Carolina must release
downstream. 6 Under the current license agreements, which were issued
in 1958, FERC requires dam owners to release a minimum daily average
flow of 1200 cfs. In 2000, the average flow of the Pee Dee River was 4990
cfs, but in August of 2002 the average flow fell to 930 cfs. An emergency
agreement between FERC and affected parties was reached in August
2002 to maintain a water flow of 900 cfs daily.
Table 1. Annual Mean Streamflow, Pee Dee River, 1991-2002
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Annual Mean Streamflow
(cubic feet per second)
10,750
7,984
9,737
9,416
11,550
9,480
8,749
11,420
5,008
4,990
2,145
2,772

The low water flows during the summer of 2002 resulted in
significant costs to downstream users of the river. Although the water
flow can be highly variable, falling to as low as 200 cfs on some days,
4. See, e.g., Notie H. Landford, Jr. & Lonnie L. Jones, Recreationaland Aesthetic Value of
Water Using Hedonic Price Analysis, 20 J. AGRIc. & RESouRCE ECON. 341, 347-49 (1995).
5. In South Carolina, the cities of Bennetsville, Cheraw, Florence, and Georgetown
withdraw water from the Pee Dee River. The City of Florence began to draw water from
the Pee Dee in the fall of 2002. Water Qualityfor Today and Tomorrow: City Preparesfor Startup of New Regional Water System, FLORENcE FOUNTAIN, Fall 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.cityofflorence.com/fountain/index.html.
6. Pee Dee Leaders Want Assurance Water Flow Will Meet Region's Needs, FLORENCE
MORNING NEws, Nov. 20,2003, at A7.
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recreational users of the Pee Dee have complained for years about
"weekend droughts" created by the dam owners holding back water on
weekends when less electricity is generated. South Carolina industrial
firms incurred approximately $136,000 per month in additional costs for
the rental of auxiliary pumps and additional waste treatment due to the
low flows. Also, the firms incurred at least another $2.5 million for
numerous procedures such as pursuing in-house conservation measures,
expanding wastewater holding capabilities, constructing cooling towers
the river, and drilling a system of wells to
to decrease withdrawals from
7
use.
water
surface
decrease
Although much has been written on water disputes both
internationally 8 and in the western United States, very little analysis has
been completed on water conflicts in the eastern United States. In the
present analysis, we show that the lack of clearly defined property rights
is a contributing factor in the current conflict over the water flow along
the Yadkin-Pee Dee River. We provide a simple two-sector model to
examine the impact of a water transfer program, in the spirit of Ronald
Coase, for the Yadkin-Pee Dee River.
In the following section, we discuss water rights and allocation
polices. Next, we construct a simple two-sector model that permits a
determination of the economic effects of water flow on Pee Dee River
users. In the fourth section, we examine the efficiency of current water
allocation and consider policy options that may create more efficient
solutions. Practical issues regarding the implementation of a water
market for the region are addressed in the fifth section.
WATER RIGHTS AND ALLOCATION POLICIES
In general, states in the western United States apply the prior
appropriation doctrine to determine water rights among various water
users. The prior appropriation system evolved to serve the needs of
water users in arid and semi-arid environments by giving a right to the
9
earliest water users even if that user was far from the water source. By
contrast, the eastern United States relied on the common law riparian
doctrine to determine rights to surface water such as the Yadkin-Pee Dee
7. Telephone Interview with Sally Knowles, Director, Division of Water Quality, S.C.
Department of Health and Environmental Control (Aug. 20, 2002).
8. For an extensive review of the literature on conflicts and agreements on shared
international boundary waters, see, for example, Shlomi Dinar & Ariel Dinar, Recent
Developments in the Literatureof Conflict Negotiationsand Cooperationover Shared International
Fresh Waters, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1217 (2003).
BONNIE COLBY SALIBA & DAVID B. BUSH, WATER MARKETS IN THEORY AND
9.
PRACTICE 36-37 (1987).
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River. Under the riparian doctrine, a landowner has the right to
"reasonable use" of water running through or abutting his or her land.
Therefore, the riparian right is a limited property right and is not easily
marketable. In addition, when a user dams a waterway to produce
hydropower, the regulatory authority of the FERC supersedes private
rights.
The Federal Power Act authorizes the FERC to license nonfederal dams that produce hydropower. The licenses typically extend for
30 to 50 years and include operating conditions such as the amount of
water that dam owners must release. When licensing a hydropower
dam, the FERC must "address both the economics and engineering
issues and the potential environmental and socioeconomic effects of
project development and operation." 10 The Commission is required to
"ensure that the project to be licensed is best adapted to a comprehensive
plan for developing the waterway for beneficial public purposes.""
Mitigation measures to protect environmental or other nonpower
benefits are sometimes included in FERC licenses. However, FERC
methodology generally quantifies only the net benefits from power
generation and any costs of environmental protection measures. 12
FERC guidelines do not provide for the economic interests of
downstream users of the Yadkin-Pee Dee River. Also, no incentive
mechanism accounts for the changing economic value of water flows
during periods of drought. Currently, neither the upstream nor the
downstream users have clearly defined property rights over the flow of
the Yadkin-Pee Dee River. However, since the FERC's property rights
supersede all private rights, a Coasian solution may still be possible.
When property rights are well defined and transaction costs are low, a
market allocation of water will be efficient, as described by Coase.1 3 In
the current context, the FERC has the ability to determine who has the
right to restrict the water flow along the river. Presently, the riparian
right is allocated to the dam owners but does not include the right of
exchange. If the FERC were to expand the upstream user's water rights
to include exchange or to give the rights to the downstream users
altogether, then a market of buyers and sellers could be possible.
Alternatively, if the transaction costs are substantial, the FERC could act
as an arbitrator between the competing economic interests.
10. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY
HANDBOOK, 1-2 (Apr. 2001).

11.

COMM'N,

HYDROELECTRIC

PROJECr

Id. at 1-3.

12. ROBERT BLACK Er AL., EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS FOR HYDROPOWER
RELICENSING: GUIDANCE AND ALTERNATIVE METHODS 1-4 to 1-5 (1998).

13.

LICENSING

Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 1960 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-16.

PROJECT
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Increasingly, policy makers are turning to market mechanisms to
include a wider array of economic interests in water allocation issues.
Although the efficiency of water transfers has been recognized for
decades, water transfers are not widely utilized. 14 At least 14 western
15
states have introduced water transfers to their water markets. In
of
feet
California and Arizona, agencies have transferred 100,000 acre
16
(CVP)
In California, the 1992 Central Valley Project
water.
Improvement Act introduced wide policy reforms including the creation
of a water market that transferred water between any CVP contractor
(principally farmers) and any user (principally urban water users). The
CVP is overseen by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and includes a
system of surcharges to finance a fish and wildlife restoration fund. The
CVP also allocates water to protect and enhance fish and wildlife
17
habitat.
Other incentive policies can improve water allocation. When
water prices are too low, as may be the case for some irrigation projects,
higher prices can improve efficiency.18 Alternatively, government
agencies can purchase water rights, as is the case with the Georgia
Environmental Protection Division. In Georgia, a program was
implemented that pays farmers for reducing their use of the Flint River.
In a March 2001 auction, farmers agreed to remove 33,006 acres from
19
irrigation for an average payment of $135.70 per acre. The increased
water flow protects ecosystems and endangered species.
A SIMPLE TWO-SECTOR MODEL
We construct a two-sector model of the North and South
Carolina economy in which water flow restriction of the YPDR by the
14. See, e.g., B. Delworth Gardner & Herbert H. Fullerton, Transfer Restrictions and
Misallocation of Irrigation Water, 50 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 556, 569-70 (1968); H. Vaux,
Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of Interregional Transfers, 20 WATER RESOURCES RES.
785-92 (1984); SALIBA & BUSH, supra note 9, at 4-5.
15.

MARIELLA CZETWERTYNKSI, THE SALE AND LEASING OF WATER RIGHTS IN WESTERN

STATES: AN OVERVIEW FOR THE PERIOD 1990-2001, at 2 (Andrew Young Sch. of Policy
Studies, Ga. State Univ., Water Policy Working Paper No. 2002-002, 2002), available at
http://epp.gsu.edu/waterpdf/w2002002.pdf (last visited June 16, 2005).
16. Id.
17. M. Weinberg, Assessing a Policy Grab Bag: Federal Water Policy Reform, 84 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 541, 542 (2002).
18. Ariel Dinar & J. Letey, Agricultural Water Marketing, Allocative Efficiency, and
DrainageReduction, 20 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 210 (1991).
19.

RONALD CUMMINGS ET AL., USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS FOR POLICY MAKING:

AN EXAMPLE FROM THE GEORGIA IRRIGATION REDUCTION AUCTION 27 (Andrew Young Sch.

of Policy Studies, Ga. State Univ., Water Policy Working Paper No. 2002-003, 2002),
availableat http://epp.gsu.edu/waterpdf/w2002003.pdf (last visited June 16, 2005).
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industries controlling the dams may adversely affect downstream users.
On the YDPR there are two significant withdrawal uses-city water
supply and industrial processing. There are five in-stream uses:
hydropower,
waste
disposal,
property
value
enhancement,
recreational/wildlife, and city water suppliers who need in-stream flow
to stop saltwater intrusion. In this model, the Carolinas' economy is
divided into two sectors: Sector 1, the industrial sector upstream in
control of the dams, and Sector 2, the downstream users, defined as
industrial firms and city utilities. We do not include non-market benefits
such as wildlife and habitat protection, aesthetic value, and recreational
benefits, but only consider benefits to users that either withdraw water
or discharge effluent into the water.
We employ the specific factors model as originally described by
Jones, Mayer, and Neary. 20 A key feature of the model is the
introduction of a water flow variable, z, that functions as a cooperative
input to industry upstream (Sector 1) and at the same time a negative
externality to downstream users (Sector 2). The variable z represents the
ability and willingness of upstream dam owners to restrict water flow
further, particularly during times of already low water flows, such as
under drought conditions. The ability to restrict water flow contributes
positively, along with a fixed amount of capital and a variable amount of
labor, to produce the upstream user's output. The variable z is an
externality to Sector 2 since downstream industries do not have control
over how or when upstream users decide to restrict the YPDR water
flow. Also, the upstream use of z adversely affects the output of downstream users who incur additional costs at lower water flow. For
example, if a firm is required to reduce effluent flow during periods of
low water flow, it might incur costs from increased waste treatment.
We describe the determination of all endogenous variables in the
economy when water rights are not well defined and therefore not
transferable. This is the current situation in which the FERC sets the
minimum water flow. We produce comparative static results from the
model.
For simplicity, the production technology in both sectors is one
of constant returns to scale. Both sectors employ labor that is mobile
across sectors and in fixed supply L, in the quantities L1 and L 2,
respectively. Besides labor, Sector 1 employs two other factors of
20.

R.W. Jones, A Three Factor Model in Theory, Trade, and History, in TRADE, BALANCE

OF PAYMENTS AND GRowni 3, 3-4 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al. eds., 1971); Wolfgang Mayer,

Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibriumfor a Small Open Economy, 82 J. POL. EcON. 955, 956-57
(1974); J.P. Neary, Short-Run Capital Specificity and the Pure Theory of InternationalTrade, 88
ECON. J. 488, 488-89 (1978).
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production: capital in the amount K and restrictions to the flow of river
water, in the amount z, to produce x, quantity of industrial output.
Sector 2, on the other hand, employs only two factors of production:
labor in the amount L 2 and sector specific capital, which we will refer to
as utility and industrial plants in the amount A to produce the output
x2. Firms in Sector 1 determine the optimal employment of L1 and z by
minimizing per unit cost of production. Sector 2 firms determine the
optimal employment of L 2 by minimizing average cost. The production
functions for the two sectors are:
1) x =F(L,,K,z);

+,+,+

2) x 2 =G(L2 ,-A;z); +,+,-.
In (1), the plus signs indicate that all three factors are normal inputs,
with positive marginal products. Similarly in (2), both labor and
downstream waste and water treatment plants are normal inputs, with
positive marginal products. Recall that, the negative sign of z indicates
that the increased usage of the resource z by Sector 1 increases costs for
Sector 2, and effectively constitutes a negative externality. Further, note
that in (2), Sector 2 firms have no control over Sector l's use of z under
the current FERC regulation.
All marginal products are diminishing, and the marginal
product of any given factor rises if the employment of another factor
rises in that sector. Except for the decrease in the marginal products of
labor and treatment plants for Sector 2 when z rises, all factors are
cooperative. Further, we treat the Carolinas as a small open economy, in
that it faces parametric commodity prices T, and P2 .
The wage rate is flexible and ensures full employment of labor so
that,
3) L 1 +L 2 =L.
The intersectoral mobility of labor ensures that the value of marginal
product of labor is equal in the two sectors, which in turn equals the
single economy-wide wage rate, w. This is determined by

4)

pjIMP(LI,K,z)=i

2

MP(L

2

, A;z) = w

Given the stock of capital K, the rental of capital, r is endogenously
determined by
5)p,MPK (L,, K,z) =r.
Similarly, given the fixed supply of downstream plants, A, the return
on plants is

6)

P 2 MP,(L 2 ,A;z)

= A.
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Sector 1 employs the water, z, up to the point where the value of
marginal product of this resource equals its factor price. Because z is
unpriced, upstream industrial firms employ this resource up to the point
2 where the value of marginal product of z equals zero. Therefore
7) P (LI, K, z ) = 0.
This completes the model in which seven relationships determine the
seven endogenous variables, xI, X2, L1, L 2, w, r, and A. The variables
exogenous to this model are the product prices A, T2. and factor
supplies L, K and A.
To determine the equilibrium values for this model economy,
recall from (7) that the unpriced input, z, will be employed by the
upstream sector until the value of its marginal product equals 0. We will
call this value 2, where the hat represents an equilibrium value of the
input. With the determination of z equal to 2 in equilibrium, from
equations (3) and (4) we obtain both the employment levels of labor in
the two sectors, L1 and L12 and the wage rate ii. Consider that on the
left hand side of (4) with a given level of capital and usage of z up to 2,
the value of the marginal product of labor in the upstream industry is
determined for each level of labor, L1 up to L. Similarly, on the right
hand side of (4), the value of the marginal product of labor in Sector 2 is
determined for each level of L2 up to f" given 2 determined by upstream
users and the fixed supply of downstream facilities, A. Further, the
mobility of labor between these two sectors equalizes the values of their
marginal products at the economy wide wage rate, i, and thereby along
with the fixed total supply of labor, L, in (3) determines the equilibrium
levels of labor in the two sectors,
and L2 . Finally, given the levels of
the factor supplies determined above, from (5) and (6) we obtain the

£L

equilibrium values of P and

2.

A WATER TRANSFER PROGRAM
In the framework of this two-sector model, we investigate the
consequences of a FERC decision that creates a water market as an
alternative to the traditional command and control policy that the FERC
uses to control water flow. We consider a FERC policy that sets a
minimum flow requirement but allows the dam owners to sell water
flow above the required amount to users either upstream or
downstream. However, for ease of exposition, we will continue to refer
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to Sector 1 as upstream users and Sector 2 as downstream users. We
assume, initially, that transaction costs are low.
In this framework, the benefits of the water transfer program are
described below. In Sector 2, we represent the value to the downstream
firms of a unit reduction in river water (an increase in z) on the YPDR by
2
2
MC =- p2fP (L2 , A; z), where MC refers to the marginal cost of a
reduced flow to the downstream industrial firms and city utilities sector.
Recall that before Sector 1 was given the right to sell its use of the
unpriced environmental resource, z, Sector 1 would continue to use z up
to 2 where the value of its marginal product was zero, irrespective of
the cost imposed on Sector 2. However, since Sector 1 has been granted
the ability to sell this right, there now exists an incentive to choose a level
of z such that the value of the marginal product of z to Sector 1 is equal
to the marginal cost of z to Sector 2. That is,
(L,K,z) = -P 2 (l 22 ,A )=
8)
where j5, is the equilibrium price of the resource z as traded between
the two sectors.
The increase in water flow (a decrease in z) reduces the cost in
value added to downstream firms to a greater degree than the fall in
value added to upstream industry, leading to an unambiguous increase
in the real Gross State Product of the Carolinas. At the resource employment level of 2 , the marginal cost to downstream users from an increase
in z is greater than the gain to industry (equal to zero) due to the same
increase. If transaction costs are small, Sector 1 has an incentive to sell
the use of z to Sector 2 and Sector 2 is better off than by buying those
rights. The equilibrium quantity of water flow for Sector 1 declines from
to Y.
In this model, the marginal product of labor and the marginal
productivity are endogenous variables. The marginal product of labor
declines in Sector 1 because labor, capital, and water flow are
cooperative inputs. The reduced marginal productivity of Sector 1 labor
causes the industrial wage to fall. Workers, therefore, migrate from
Sector 1 to Sector 2, thereby causing the wage rate in Sector 2 to also fall.
However, the increase in water flow raises the productivity of Sector 2
workers, thereby causing the value of the marginal product of labor for
downstream users to increase. The relative magnitude of the labor
market leaves the direction of the equilibrium wage rate in the economy
unclear and may result in i > iv or i < v.
As Sector 1 uses less water and fewer workers are employed, the
productivity of capital falls and causes the return to capital to also fall to
', which is less than i. The productivity of Sector 2 rises because of
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reduced disruptions to water flow and increased employment of labor in
that sector. As a consequence, the return on waste and water treatment
plants rises to 2X. Further, Sector 1 output declines because z and L1 fall.
Sector 2 output rises, however, because z increases and L2 rises. Sector 1
capital owners are worse off because rK is less than PK, although
Sector 2 plant owners benefit because for a given number of downstream
facilities the per unit returns rise to

2.

PRACTICAL ISSUES OF WATER MARKETS
The degree to which water transfers occur depends on the
opportunity costs to the users. For example, firms emitting waste into
streams can reduce their environmental impact by using holding ponds
to decrease the amount of effluent discharged into the river. If holding
ponds are more cost-effective than purchasing water from dam owners,
firms will prefer the former approach. Moreover, some water uses are
more higly valued than others. Frederick et al. observe that the highest
average water use values generally are for industrial processing ($282
per acre foot) and domestic use ($194 per acre foot), while hydropower
($25 per acre foot) is generally the lowest. 21 However, timing is very
important for hydropower. Indeed, Progress Energy uses their two dams
primarily for peaking and load-following generation. On the YPDR,
water demand for irrigation is likely to be low, while demand for
domestic use is likely to be high.
Although earlier we assumed that transaction costs from
transfers will be low, this may not be the case. If transaction costs, which
include conveyance, information, and enforcement costs, are high, fewer
water transfers will occur. As a practical matter, transaction costs can be
reduced by auction as in southern Georgia with the Georgia
Environmental Protection Division. 22 For the YPDR water market that
we propose, conveyance costs are nominal, because the water flow
changes by increasing or decreasing the flow from the dam. Information
costs could involve searching for trading partners, negotiating prices,
and identifying legal requirements. 23 Water markets may not develop
because of the high costs of monitoring and measuring the resource. 24
For example, when an agency must monitor each individual farmer to
21.

KENNETH. D. FREDERICK ET AL., ECONOMIC VALUES OF FRESHWATER IN THE U.S., 9

tbl. 3.1 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 97-03,1997).
22.
23.

CUMMINGS ET AL., supra note 19, at 24.
SALI BA & BUSH, supra note 9, at 239.

24.

Id. at 27.
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see if irrigation restrictions are being met, enforcement costs are much
higher. However, monitoring water flow from the dams should not be
costly, because the U.S. Geological Survey maintains a number of
gauging stations throughout the YPDR basin.
The costs of a water transfer should include the full opportunity
cost to the user, including the effects on public interest values and third
parties. Although the transfer program may benefit upstream and
downstream users, it may be inefficient from a societal perspective if
nonmarket benefits such as recreation value and wildlife habitat are not
included in the transfer negotiations. Groups concerned with uses that
depend on in-stream flow may not be well represented in negotiations
because they may be poorly organized or subject to the free-rider
problem. Although contract restrictions impose transaction costs on
participants, the costs may be necessary to protect third-party and public
interests. To maintain in-stream flow for recreational use and habitat
protection, a mechanism could be developed within the water transfer
program. For example, a fee could be levied on all transfers, as is the case
in the CVP. 25 A state agency could monitor stream conditions and use
the fees to purchase increased stream-flow for habitat protection. It is
possible that private conservation groups such as The Nature
Conservancy would purchase water rights to improve wildlife habitat.
As demand for nonmarket benefits such as wildlife habitat increases, the
value of increased flow for such uses is likely to be higher.
A potential concern from creating a water market is that
redistributing water rights may affect water quality. Weber shows that
the water seller's location can affect water quality. 26 For example, if
upstream water buyers purchase water flow and thereby reduce
downstream flow, water quality downstream could deteriorate as less
pollutants are assimilated. The YPDR is water quality limited for
dissolved oxygen for a segment downstream from the city of Florence.
To control such problems, the water contract could be conditioned on
restricting trades that cause water quality deterioration. State agencies
such as the S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control
would restrict actions that led to water quality deterioration. Also, courts
have enforced the Public Trust Doctrine to protect water quality. 27
Alternatively, a program of effluent trading could be implemented to
25. John B. Loomis, Water Transfer and Major Environmental Provisions of the Central
Valley ProjectImprovement Act: A PreliminaryEconomic Evaluation,30 WATER RESOURCEs RES.
1865, 1868 (1994).
26. Marian L. Weber, Markets for Water Rights Under Environmental Constraints,42 J.
ENvrL. EcoN. & MGivrT. 53, 54 (2001).
27. SALIBA & BUSH, supra note 9, at 249.
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decrease transaction costs. A case study of effluent trading on the YPDR
found efficiency gains from such a program. 28 A comprehensively
defined water rights market should incorporate water quality conditions,
although this may increase transaction costs for buyers and sellers.
Chile's experiment in water markets provides important
practical insights for understanding the advantages and disadvantages
of water markets. 29 Chile's 1981 Water Code strengthened private
property rights, implemented market incentives, and reduced state
regulations in order to improve water allocation. The Water Code has
encouraged some agricultural areas to invest in more efficient irrigation
and made it easier to change the allocation and use of water. However,
water rights sales and transactions have been uncommon due to
transaction costs and private investment in more efficient water use has
been less than expected. This is due in part to the limitations of
geography, infrastructure, legal and administrative complexities,
3°
cultural and psychological attitudes, and ambiguous economic signals.
Some available models can provide guidance on the design of a
water market institution, which can be critical to the success of transfers.
The "smart" market concept "combine[s] the information and incentive
ownership rights.. .with" central
advantages of decentralized
31
coordination programs. Murphy contends that the "smart" uniformprice double auction yielded highly efficient outcomes even with a
32
limited number of trading opportunities for each participant. The
double auction, in which initial allocations for participants are
grandfathered in, may be an appropriate method to conduct trades.
Electronic trading systems can provide useful information that may
reduce transaction costs and facilitate trade. Another laboratory
experiment considered what pricing and closing rules should be used, as
33
well as how provisional results should be reported. The Georgia
Environmental Protection Division implemented their recommendation
of an iterative discrimination auction in March 2001.

28. Sean Blacklocke, Effluent Trading in South Carolina, in THE MARKET MEETS THE
ENVIRONMENT 205, 222 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1999).
29. CARL J. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT: PRIVATIZATION, WATER MARKETS AND THE
STATE IN CHILE (1998).

30. Id. at 33-36.
31. Kevin A. McCabe, Smart Computer-Assisted Markets, 254 SCIENCE 534,534 (1991).
32. James J. Murphy et al., The Design of "Smart" Water Market Institutions Using
Laboratory Experiments, 17 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 375, 393 (2000).
33. CUMMINGS ET AL., supra note 19, at 11, 25.
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CONCLUSION
In light of recent federal policy reforms like the Central Valley
Project Improvement Act and increasing demands for scarce water, a
water transfer program for YPDR users may be practical as well as
desirable. When the FERC issued the licenses for the six dams almost 50
years ago, downstream users placed little demand on water flow. Today,
as relicensing of the dams is being undertaken, downstream users
demand greater amounts of water. Although the critical shortage of
water flow on the Pee Dee River in 2002 was partially the result of a fiveyear drought in the Carolinas, growing demand for water will likely
create the need to make difficult allocation choices in coming years. One
reason that a YPDR water market has not developed is that, when river
water is not very scarce, the costs of creating a market are greater than
the benefits. Increasing demand for Pee Dee water will create a stronger
incentive to better define, monitor, and enforce property rights. Better
defined property rights would require an institutional change that
would be similar to changes that some western states have already
implemented.
To make water markets work, the economic benefits to the
buyers must outweigh the costs of obtaining the water. Until the conflicts
over YPDR water supply arose in 2002, there was little reason to
question the efficacy of the command and control approach as an
allocation mechanism. With growing demand for water, our simple
model shows that creating a market to allocate YPDR water-flow
increases societal welfare.
A Coasean solution to the problem of inefficient resource use
relies on well-defined property rights to create market exchanges to
improve resource allocation. In the framework of a simple two-sector
model, we investigated the consequences of a FERC decision that awards
transferable water rights to Sector 1 (industries upstream that control the
dams). The creation of a water market will increase the real gross state
product in both North and South Carolina. We expect that the decision
will increase Sector 2's value added more than it decreases Sector l's
value added, because the benefits of increased water flow are greater
than the costs. A policy change that defines property rights to include
exchange rates would create a market for the resource z. With a market,
because the rights to water can be transferred, water will be allocated to
it's highest valued in-stream or withdrawal use.
In addition to improving resource allocation, water markets
have several advantages over the current policy of the FERC setting the
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minimum amount of water flow. A water transfer program can adjust for
34
demand changes that result from changes in weather patterns. When
drought years occur, water prices will rise and, if water is plentiful,
prices will fall. Markets also encourage users to consider the opportunity
cost of their decisions. For example, if a dam operator could increase
operational efficiency with a technological change, the firm would do so
if other water users were willing to pay for increased water flow.
Across the United States, 139 dam licenses expire between 2003
and 2010, and many others that have already expired are going through
the relicensing process. Negotiations on the YPDR dam licenses, which
expire April 30, 2008, began in the fall of 2004. A recent study that
examined 72 projects relicensed between 1980 and 1996 found that the
FERC does not explicitly weigh the social benefits and costs of
relicensing decisions. 35 Clearly there is room for improved analysis and
policy. Given the growing demand for water in many places, it is likely
that the FERC will scrutinize various policy issues. A better
understanding of the economic impact of water flow decisions will
improve policy choices that will shape the Carolinas' future.

34. Because the dams would be able to have water reserves during drought periods (as
was the case in 2002), the dams can improve societal welfare.
35. Michael R. Moore et al., Testing Theories of Agency Behavior: Evidence from
Hydropower Project Relicensing Decisions of the FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission, 77 LAND
ECON. 423,440 (2001).

